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Equal Protection in Special Admissions
Programs: Forward from Bakke
By JULIUS STONE*

Introduction
Few United States Supreme Court decisions in recent years have
been so widely anticipated as the "reverse discrimination case," Regents
of the University of Caifornia v. Bakke. I The purpose of this article is
to analyze Bakke's equal protection holding and to offer an assessment
of what the decision means for academic special admissions programs.
In particular, discussion will focus on how race may be used as a factor
in admissions decisions consistently with the equal protection clause of
the Federal Constitution.:
I.

Issues and Outcomes of Bakke

The California Supreme Court in Bakke v. Regents of University of
Caiffornia3 handed down two rulings which were subsequently appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The first, reversing the
trial court, was that Alan Bakke was entitled to an injunction ordering
his admission to the medical school of the University of California at
Davis. On the second issue, the state supreme court upheld the trial
court's ruling that the special admissions program used at Davis was
invalid, since it made admissions depend on considerations of race, in
* Professor of Law, University of New South Wales; Distinguished Professor of Jurisprudence and International Law, University of California Hastings College of the Law.
LL.M., 1930, Leed; SJ.D., 1932 Harvard University; D.C.L., 1934 Oxford; LL.D., honoris
causa, Leeds.
1. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
2. See e.g., W. MCCORMACK, THE

BAKKE DECISION: IMPLICATIONS FOR HIGHER ED-

(1975); A. SINDLER, BAKKE, DE FUNIS AND MINORITY ADMISSIONS 284-325
(1978); Symposiun" Regents of the Universizy of California v. Bakke, 67 CAL. L. REV. I
(1979) [hereinafter the articles contained therein will be cited individually]; The Supreme
UCATION

Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1, 131-48 (1978).

3. 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976).
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violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4
In a complex decision, the United States Supreme Court affirmed

in part and reversed in part the decision of the California court. The
dramatic and rather Solomonic divisions in the Supreme Court hinged
partly on the distinctness of the two issues and partly on the rules inyoked by the various Justices to decide them. On the first issue, a majority of five affirmed the California Supreme Court's order that Bakke
should be admitted because of the illegality of the U.C. Davis special

admissions program which had excluded him. This majority consisted
of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens, Stewart and Rehnquist in
a common judgment 5 and Justice Powell, who announced the judgment
of the Court.6

The four Justices other than Justice Powell comprising this majority decided the first issue in Bakke's favor on a ground involving
neither the equal protection clause nor even the prohibition against discrimination contained in section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. 7 Bakke, they said, must be admitted because section 601 pro-

hibits not only discrimination in a federally funded program against
any person on grounds of race, color or national origin, but also no less
peremptorily prohibits exclusion on these grounds from the benefits of

such a program. Section 601, they insisted, is a congressional prohibition of a wider ambit than the equal protection clause; exclusion is prohibited independently of discrimination. "[T]he meaning of the Title

VI ban on exclusion is crystal clear: Race cannot be the basis of excluding anyone from participation in a federally funded program. ' 8 Since
sixteen out of the one hundred places at Davis were reserved for minor4. In the trial court, but not in the California Supreme Court, article I, section 21, of
the California Constitution and the Federal Civil Rights Act were cited. See paragraph 3 of
the trial court opinion quoted in 438 U.S. at 409 n.2 (Stevens, Burger, Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.). The California constitutional provision, now article I, section 7, states: "(b) A
citizen or class of citizens may not be granted privileges or immunities not granted on the
same terms to all citizens. Privileges or immunities granted by the legislature may be altered
or revoked." (West Supp. 1979).
5. 438 U.S. at 408-21 (Stevens, Burger, Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.). Hereinafter these
four justices will be referred to as the Stevens Four.
6. Id. at 269-324 (Powell, J.). Concurring in part and dissenting in part were Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun [hereinafter referred to as the Brennan Four].
7. Title VI, section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: "No person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). See 438 U.S. 40821 (Stevens, Burger, Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.).
8. 438 U.S. at 418 (Stevens, Burger, Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.).
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ity applicants, Bakke was unlawfully excluded from the benefits of the
funding for those places.
For the Stevens Four it was thus not necessary to resolve general
questions of the lawfulness of benign discrimination grounded on race
in admission programs. And, in view of the Court's policy of not deciding constitutional issues in a case which can be fairly decided on a
mere statutory ground, they found it improper to rule on the equal protection aspect of benign discrimination. 9 Important for admissions programs as the correct interpretation of section 601 may be, it is not of
major interest for the present article, which is focused on the equal protection standard. 10 Correspondingly, the discussion shall proceed

forthwith in this and the following sections to the second issue, as to
which the opinions do address the equal protection question.

Justice Powell, while agreeing that Bakke's exclusion was unlawful, did so because in his view section 601 merely incorporates the constitutional requirements of equal protection as the standard governing
federally funded programs. It must therefore be held "to proscribe
only those racial classifications that would violate the equal protection
clause or the Fifth Amendment." 1 Measuring the Davis special admissions program against this constitutional standard, he first found
(contrary to the Brennan Four, and for reasons to be explored later)
that it utilized a suspect class and called for strict scrutiny.12 He recalled that this required a showing that the state's "purpose or interest is

both constitutionally permissible and substantial," as well as a showing
that the challenged classification is "necessary. . . to the accomplishment of its purpose. . . ."I' At the threshold of this scrutiny, he de-

clared that while the purpose of assuring percentage racial
9. Id. at 411. (Stevens, Burger, Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.).
10. For the same reason the question of whether section 601 confers private rights of
action for breaches shall not be pursued. The Stevens Four held that since this question was
not raised below by the Regents, it was not properly before the Court. 438 U.S. at 418-19
(Stevens, Burger, Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.). Justice Powell, for the same reason, assumed
that a private action would lie, 1d. at 283-84 (Powell, J.), and the Brennan Four (except for
Justice White) agreed. Id. at 328 & n.8 (Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.). Thus the
private right of action was assumed rather than determined by eight of the nine Justices.
The ninth, Justice White, devoted his entire separate opinion to negativing, on the basis of
the legislative proceedings, the existence of any private right. Id. at 379-87 (White, J.). To
recognize such a right, he said, would "jeopardize the administrative processes." Id. at 386
(White, J.). He also affirmed that "apparently" four justices held that a private right arose,
id. at 379-80 (White, J.), but there is nothing in the written opinions to support this.
11. 438 U.S. at 287 (Powell, J.). This is a point on which the Brennan Four agreed.
12. Id. at 289-91 (Powell, J.). This accords with the California Supreme Court decision.
See 18 Cal. 3d at 50, 553 P.2d at 1163, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
13. Id. at 305 (Powell, J.) (citing In re Griffths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973)).
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representation at U.C. Davis by means of a racial quota met the test of
being substantial, it was still constitutionally impermissible for it preferred some persons for "no other reason than race or ethnic origin."' 4

The exclusion of Bakke was thus unlawful for Powell on constitutional
grounds, and he joined the Stevens Four in affirming the California
court on this first issue.
On the second issue, however, concerning the California court's
ruling that prohibited U.C. Davis "from according any consideration to
race [of any applicant] in its admissions process,"' 5 Justice Powell held
for reversal. His judgment, combined with that of the Brennan Four,
constituted another majority of five.' 6 As will shortly be seen in detail,
the reading of equal protection law on which Powell proceeded permits
the use of race in the admissions process only within the following limits:
(1) the process should not use numerical racial quotas to achieve
the purpose of assuring percentage racial representation;
(2) where the purpose of non-governmental bodies is voluntarily
to take affirmative compensatory action to alleviate disadvantages arising from past racial discrimination, such action is not lawful until and
unless there has been a state or federal determination, whether legislative, judicial or administrative, that such disadvantages exist; and
(3) since the rights conferred by the equal protection clause are
rights of individuals and not of groups, remedial action should be predicated on the disadvantages suffered by individuals. The mere fact that
a racial group has been discriminated against does not justify automatic compensatory preference to every member of the group. These
limits still left a large ambit within which race could be considered in
designing benign discrimination (compensatory preference); the California court's blanket proscription of any consideration of race had to
be reversed. The Brennan Four, as will be seen, held that there was no
constitutional or other basis for these three limitations on the consideration of race for purposes of benign discrimination insisted on by JusCourt's proscription
tice Powell. For them, therefore, the California
7
was a fortiori wrong and had to be reversed.'
As against the California court's wholesale proscription of the use
14. Id. at 307 (Powell, J.).
15. Id. at 272, 320 (Powell, J.).
16. As already seen the Stevens Four found it unnecessary and indeed improper to pass
on the second issue. See also note 82 and accompanying text infra.
17. 438 U.S. at 356, 369, 378-79 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.). As to
limits (1) and (3), see Justice Blackmun's separate opinion, id. at 402-08 (Blackmun, J.).
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of race in admissions programs, there was sufficient solidarity between
Justice Powell and the Brennan Four to ensure reversal. In a future
case, however, this majority would disintegrate, with Justice Powell opposed to the Brennan Four, if the limits insisted on by Powell were not
respected-either because of the use of numerical racial quotas, or because a non-governmental public body has acted before there has been
a state or federal determination that disadvantages are being suffered

as a result of past unlawful discrimination, or where the compensatory
benefits are conferred on a racial group in a manner foreclosing the
question of whether the individuals concerned have been disadvantaged

by past denial of equal protection rights. Outcomes would then depend
on how the members of what was the Stevens Four-who in Bakke
declined to address the equal protection issue-aligned themselves on

that matter as between the opposing standpoints.
II.
A.

Whether and How Far Admissions Programs May Be
"Race-Conscious": Justice Powell

Individual or Group Equal Protection

Justice Powell's ground for joining with the Stevens Four in a majority affirmance of the order for Bakke's admission was that his exclusion by dint of the numerical quota for racial minorities went beyond
the ambit of constitutionally permissible consideration of race as a factor in admissions programs. This holding on the first issue flowed from
Powell's specification of the permissible limits of race consideration.
And what these limits are, in turn, constituted the second issue in the

Bakke case, on which he joined in another majority holding, this time
with the Brennan Four.

Justice Powell began with the assertion (with which the Brennan
Four unqualifiedly concurred)"8 that the terms of Section 601 of Title
18. These justices recognized that they were abandoning the view which they had taken
in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), that the Title VI prohibition might be wider than that
of the equal protection clause. -d. at 352 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
They supported their changed view by reference to the legislative proceedings, id. at 328-40
(Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.), and took issue with the Stevens Four's reading of the same proceedings. Id. at 340-42, n.17 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun,
JJ.). The effect is that they denied the Stevens Four's reading of Title VI as forbidding
exclusion and denial of benefits as well as discrimination.
Neither Justice Powell nor the Brennan Four really offered an answer to the Stevens
Four on how exclusion and denial of benefits are to be read out of the prohibitions in section
601, or how, if they are left in, some meaning in addition to the prohibition of discrimination
is to be avoided. Two answers at least might have been worth offering: (1) that section 601
refers to exclusion and other actions merely as extreme examples of violations of equal pro-
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VI and its legislative history show that it "must be held to proscribe
only those racial classifications that would violate the equal protection
clause or the Fifth Amendment."' 9 The learned Justice thus equated
the issue of whether race could be considered in special admission programs under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act with the question of
whether it could be so considered under the equal protection clause.
His basic exposition, therefore, is in terms of the history and present
ambit of that constitutional provision. 0
Justice Powell saw the following propositions as established. First,
rights enuring under the Fourteenth Amendment are rights of individuals and are guaranteed to individuals. Accordingly, as between individuals of different races, "[i]f both are not accorded the same
protection, then [treatment] is not equal. ' 21 Second, whites are entitled
to this protection even if they do not constitute such a "discrete and
insular minority" as would make them a suspect class entitled to special
solicitude under the equal protection clause.2 2 Third, the mere fact that
the Court's reinterpretation of equal protection since the 1950's focused
on the rights of the black minority should not conceal its basic meaning
that all "[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry"
are "odious to a free people" and thus violative of equal protection.'s
So much Justice Powell thought clear on authority.2 4 But he also
questioned the sociological validity of a "two-class theory" which treats
minorities in one way and the majority in another, authorizing discrimination against whites merely because this operates benignly toward
blacks. "Majority whites" themselves consist, he thought, of various
minority groups, unless that class refers only to "White Anglo-Saxon
Protestant," and at that point they would be just another minority. Preferred status for some minorities as against others, free of strict scrutiny, would in these circumstances require constant rankings and
tection; and (2) that Bakke was not excluded from the total pool of applicants for admission,
but only from the 16% of reserved places, and only the former would constitute exclusion.
19. Id. at 287 (Powell, J.).
20. Id. at 291-99 (Powell, J.).
21. Id. at 290 (Powell, J.).
22. Id. at 290 & n.28 (Powell, J.).
23. Id. at 290-91 (Powell, J.), (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) and
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
24. The language of the Fourteenth Amendment speaks of personal rights: "No state
shall... deny to any person... the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend.
XWV, § 1. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948). Justice Powell noted that racial
distinctions have been subjected to strict scrutiny without any necessity for finding a discrete
minority. 438 U.S. at 290 (Powell, J.) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
and Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94-97 (1965)).
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rerankings among them, presupposing ongoing "sociological and political analysis [which] simply does not lie within judicial competence,"
even if it were desirable.
As to desirability, the very demand for benign preference raised

"serious problems ofjustice. '2 6 What is benign may not be evident on

the face of things. Does the Constitution require individuals to bear
otherwise "impermissible burdens" to enhance the "societal standing"
of ethnic groups? What principle requires that grievances be remedied

by burdening persons innocent of any wrong? Would not the ranking
and reranking of groups for preference inevitably reflect "the ebb and
flow of political forces," thus exacerbating rather than alleviating racial
and ethnic antagonisms? May not such preferential programs "only
reinforce common stereotypes" that certain groups are unable to
achieve success without special protection based on a factor having no

relation to individual worth? Underlying most of these questions is the
principle of justice that burdens as well as benefits should fall on the

individual as such and not flow from membership in a particular
group.2 7 When this principle is departed from by a discriminatory

measure, the individual concerned is entitled to ask for strict judicial
scrutiny to ensure that any departure is "precisely tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest. 28
B.

Strict Scrutiny

Since, in Justice Powell's view, Fourteenth Amendment rights inhere in individuals and not in groups, he accepted Bakke's argument

that strict scrutiny was applicable to any discrimination against a racial
group, including whites, and was therefore applicable in this case. Correspondingly, he rejected the Regents' submission that strict scrutiny
was inapplicable. They had argued that strict scrutiny only be applied
when the challenged discrimination was against discrete and insular
25. 438 U.S. at 297 (Powell, J.). This comports with the California Supreme Court's
analysis. See 18 Cal. 3d at 50 n.16, 553 P.2d at 1163 n.16, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 691 n.16. See
also Lavinsky, De Funis v. Odegaard The 'Won-Decfs/on" with A Message, 75 COLUM. L.
REv.520, 527 (1975). The most cogent and comprehensive development of these points and
critique of the Brennan opinion in their light appears in A. SINDLER, supranote 2, at 301-07.
On Justice Blackmun's ambivalent position, see id. at 303.
26. Id. at 298 (Powell, J.).
27. The contrary view of the Brennan Four is discussed infra. The critical factor is not
whether a group or a single person is the claimant. It is rather whether the rights claimed by
the litigants are claimed in their capacity as members of a racial or ethnic group (impermissible), or as individuals subject to substantially the same admission criteria as all other individuals (permissible). See A. SINDLER, supra note 2, at 303.
28. 438 U.S. at 299 (Powell, J.).
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minorities; discrimination against whites cannot be suspect insofar as it
is benign towards blacks.2 9
Justice Powell distinguished the cases offered by the University of
California to avoid strict scrutiny.3" The school desegregation cases
were preceded by judicial findings of constitutional violations which
the challenged racial classifications attempted to remedy in due proportion.31 In the employment discrimination cases, the exemption from
strict scrutiny was predicated on prior "proven constitutional or statutory violations. ' 3z The controversial decision on reapportionment,
United Jewish Organizationsv. Carey,33 was based on a finding by the
Justice Department under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that blacks
were subjected by the existing apportionment to an unlawful dilution
of voting power. And in Lau v. Nichols,34 the Supreme Court's order,
issued without strict scrutiny, that remedial English instruction be provided was preceded by regulations under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act which required this in cases where inability to understand English
excluded children from educational programs. Thus, there was at least
an implied administrative determination of prior discrimination.
The only non-strict scrutiny precedents which lacked a prior determination of past discrimination were, in the Justice's view, those relating to gender-based classifications. He distinguished these by noting
that only two classes were involved, making class-wide adjustment
more feasible. 36 Preferential treatment based on ethnic origin, by contrast, presents serious classification problems. With what could be
characterized as male complaceiicy, Powell added that, as a matter of
history, gender-based distinction does not carry the odiousness of racial
discrimination.
29. Id. at 287-99 (Powell, J.). "It is far too late to argue that ... equal protection to all
persons permits the recognition of special wards entitled to... protection greater than that
accorded others." Id. at 295 (Powell, J.). Though, Justice Powell added, discreteness and
insularity were still relevant in identifying new "suspect" classes or in deciding the outcome
of strict scrutiny. Id. at 290 (Powell, J.).
30. Id. at 300-05. (Powell, J.).
31. Id. at 300-01. (Powell, J.). See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S.
406 (1977); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
32. Id. at 302 (Powell, J.). See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747
(1975). The California Supreme Court also so found. See 18 Cal. 3d at 57 n.25, 553 P.2d at
1168 n.25, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 696 n.25.
33. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
34. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
35. 438 U.S. at 303-04 (Powell, J.).
36. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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C. The University of California at Davis Special Admissions Program37
Adopting the formulation enunciated in In re Griths,3 8 Justice
Powell held that "in 'order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a
State must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is "necessary. . to the accomplishment of its purpose or the safeguarding of
its interest.' "19 At the outset, as already seen,' he ruled that the Regents' first purpose of assuring a percentage racial representation by
means of a racial quota was "constitutionally impermissible" since it
preferred some persons for "no reason other than race or ethnic origin." 4 What he ruled out as a purpose or policy objective could, of
course, equally be regarded as a means towards achieving the other
three purposes said by the University to be served by racial quotas,
purposes which Powell admitted might be "substantial and constitutionally permissible:" (1) reducing the historical deficit of disfavored
minorities; (2) improving the provision of health services to minorities;
and (3) securing the benefits of a diversified student body. However, it
is clear that he would rule out racial quotas as a means of achieving
these purposes, as he ruled out quotas for the purpose of achieving diversity of the student body quite expressly.
Justice Powell detected flaws affecting two of these other three purposes. First, while "reducing the historic deficit of disfavoured minorities" was qua purpose and policy objective permissible,4 2 he had
already ruled that where it was pursued by a non-governmental public
body, the cases permit such compensatory action only after judicial,
legislative or administrative findings of past discrimination.4 3 Until
such findings are made, the state has no "compelling justification" for
37. 438 U.S. at 305-15 (Powell, J.).
38. 413 U.S. 717 (1973). Griffiths held that a state could not prevent resident aliens from
taking the bar examination, a prerequisite to the practice of law. Griffiths restated the strict
scrutiny test: "The Court has consistently emphasized that a State which adopts a suspect
classification 'bears a heavy burden of justification,'... a burden which, though variously
formulated, requires the State to meet certain standards of proof. In order to justify the use
of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is 'necessary ... to the
accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest ....." Id. at 721-22 (footnotes omitted). Grifffths explained that "substantial" state interest means that the state interest is "overriding," "compelling" or "important." Id. at 722 n.9.
39. 438 U.S. at 305 (Powell, J.).
40. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
41. 438 U.S. at 307 (Powell, J.).
42. 1d.
43. Id. at 301-02 (Powell, J.). California's high court also so reasoned. See 18 Cal. 3d
at 57-58 n.25, 553 P.2d at 1168 n.25, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 696 n.25.
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compensatory preference.' Because there were no such findings here
and the Regents were not competent to make them,45 bestowing such

competence would allow a capricious privilege to prefer some groups to
others.46 Second, while the purpose or policy objective of improving
health services to minorities, asserted by the Regents, could be a sufficiently compelling purpose, there was "virtually no evidence in the rec-

ord" that the University of California program was "either needed or
geared to promote that goal." The special admissions program neither
included a requirement that minority applicants show special concern
for serving disadvantaged minorities nor gave similar preference to
non-minority applicants who did.47
The final policy objective asserted by the Regents, that of securing
educational benefits of ethnic diversity in the student body, was acknowledged by Justice Powell as important. Since diversity encourages
an atmosphere of "speculation, experiment and creation" and "robust"
exchange, there is a First Amendment-based constitutional interest in

promoting this diversity, and this certainly constituted a compelling interest. 4s Even though diversity in the student body thus "clearly is a

constitutionally permissible goal," the question still remained whether
the Regents' fixing of quotas on a two-track ethnic basis (even if
amended to a multi-track ethnic basis) was a necessary or even feasible
means of achieving it. Such quotas wrongly identify ethnic diversity
with the diversity sought, for ethnic background is only one element in
the desired diversity.4 9 Justice Powell specified that "[t]he diversity
that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics. . . ,.o Promotion of benefi-

cial educational pluralism requires qualities such as "exceptional
44. Id. at 308-09 (Powell, J.).
45. Id. at 309 (Powell, J.).
46. The Brennan Four observed that, in any case, the California Constitution and statutes had delegated to the Regents sufficient "plenary legislative and administrative power"
over the University to make such a finding. Id. at 366-67 n.42 (Brennan, White, Marshall
and Blackmun, JJ.). On this and related questions of other University trustees, see O'Neil,
Bakke in Balance: Some PreliminaryThoughts, 67 CAL. L. REV. 143, 153-56 (1979). This
difference does not affect the basic issues here under examination.
47. Id . at 310-11 (Powell, J.). Justice Powell cited studies indicating that underrepresentation of blacks may be due merely to the small pool of qualified black applicants.
Id. at 311 n.47.
48. Id. (quoting Sweezey v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
49. Justice Powell cited the Harvard College admissions program where "critical criteria are often individual qualities or experience not dependent upon race but sometimes associated with it." Id. at 324 (Powell, J.).
50. Id. at 315 (Powell, J.).
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personal talents, unique work or service experience, leadership potenthe poor" as well as
tial, maturity, . . . ability to communicate with
background. 5 1

considerations of race or ethnic

D.

The Interface Between the Issues

On the question of issuing a mandatory injunction, as already
seen, Justice Powell agreed with the Stevens Four that Bakke's right to
admission must be affirmed. But while their ground was that his exclusion was in direct conflict with the words of section 601, Justice Powell's ground was that it amounted to discrimination under the equal
protection clause, to which he equated the proscription of section 601.
But the very setting of limits on the permissible use of race criteria
which led him to conclude that the use of numerical racial quotas was
not permissible so that Bakke was unlawfully excluded, also led him to
conclude, with respect to the validity of the U.C. Davis program, that
the California court's prohibition of "any consideration of the race of
' in admissions programs was too wide and must be
any applicant" 52
reversed. On this second issue Justice Powell's concurrence moved to
the Brennan Four. The delimitation of the permissible consideration of
race was the interface between the two issues.
HI.

Whether and How Far Admissions Programs May Be
53
"Race-Conscious": The Brennan Four

As already seen, the four remaining Justices (the "Brennan Four")
who dissented on the issue of Bakke's admission, since they would allow benign discrimination consisting of numerical racial quotas, agreed
with Powell that tests could be "race-conscious." They were, with Justice Powell, a majority of five for reversing the California Supreme
Court's wide ban on any use of race-based criteria. In the Brennan
Four's own formulation, they reversed the judgment below "insofar as
it prohibits the University from establishing race-conscious programs
in the future."'
Strictly, of course, this holding would only permit the use of racebased criteria within the limits common to them and Justice Powell.
Indeed, after admitting that none of the opinions in the case spoke for
5 I.Id. at 317 (Powell, J.).
52. Id. at 320 (Powell, J.). See 18 Cal. 3d at 53-56, 553 P.2d at 1165-67, 132 Cal. Rptr.
at 693-96.
53. Id. at 324-79 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
54. Id. at 326 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
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the Court, the joint opinion of the Brennan Four opened with an offer
of a common denominator with Justice Powell:
But this should not and must not mask the central meaning of
today's opinions: Government may take race into account when
it acts not to demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy
disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice, at least
when appropriate findings have been made by judicial, legislative
or administrative bodies with competence to act in this area.55
Or, more briefly, universities are not prohibited from "establishing
race-conscious programs in the future."56 To be accurate, they should
perhaps have added the proviso that such programs must not be based
merel on racial factors, as are numerical racial quotas. For only with
this proviso did Justice Powell's opinion and theirs concur to make a
majority. And, subject to the same proviso, the Brennan Four and Justice Powell would also certainly be adidem that race could be used as
one from among the ingredients necessary in pursuing the policy, approved by all of them as legitimate, of producing diversity in the student body.
A closer analysis discloses that the view of the Brennan Four as to
the permissibility of benign discrimination through race-conscious admissions programs was more tolerant in the following respects than the
view of Justice Powell examined in Section II.
A.

The Distinction Between Criteria Based Solely on Race and Those
Based on Race and Other Factors

The most obvious difference is, of course, the Brennan Four's rejection of Justice Powell's sharp distinction between the impermissible
use of racial quotas either as an end in itself or as a means to achieve a
percentage representation and the permissible use of race as one preferential factor among others:
There is no sensible, and certainly no constitutional, distinction
between, for example, adding a set number of points to the admissions rating of disadvantaged minority applicants as an expression of the preference with the expectation that this will
result in the admission of an approximately determined number
of qualified minority applicants and setting5 7a fixed number of
places for such applicants as was done here.
Justice Blackmun's separate opinion similarly questioned the validity
of the line between the Powell-disapproved "two-track [race] system"
55. Id. at 325 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
56. Harvard's plan is cited as acceptable. See id.at 326 n.l (Brennan, White, Marshall
and Blackmun, JJ.).
57. Id. at 378 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).

Spring 19791

EQUAL PROTECTION

and the Powell-approved Harvard College system where race and ethnic background is only one of many factors. "The cynical," he observed, "may say that under a program such as Harvard's one may
accomplish covertly what Davis concedes it does openly;" but he
thought that the Davis program was constitutional, "though perhaps
barely so."58
In reply to Justice Powell's argument that a basket of factors, in
which the ethnic is only one, avoids the danger that two-track criteria
based on race alone will perpetuate, rather than abate, racial antagonisms, the Brennan Four seemed to plead a kind of confession and
avoidance. A range of non-ethnic factors would require each applicant
to be scored separately, on a case by case basis, as to disadvantage suffered. This, they thought, would be a "virtual impossibility," presumably as a matter of university administration. They thought, however,
that even if such separate scoring were possible, universities would not
be able to reach the persons disadvantaged by race-based discrimination through the use of non-racial criteria, such as poverty, family, or
educational background. For this conclusion they offered two reasons.
First, such criteria would encompass a far greater number of whites
than of racial minorities, by dint of the simple fact that whites are in
the majority. Second, statistics show a far lesser correlation of economic disadvantage with poor scholastic records in whites than in
blacks.59
The present writer would add a third objection, viewed from the
aspect of overall scholastic quality of the student body. It appears that
a system of racial quotas, for example in Legal Education Opportunity
Programs, tends to introduce students who are marginal in their law
school scholastic performance, resulting in a dramatically high failure
rate in bar examinations among such students after graduation.6 0 Even
if the first two objections were overcome, the result of that very success
would be to introduce into the student body a further (and much
larger) infusion of disadvantaged applicants from the white majority.
The total intake of students being fixed by other considerations, the
58. Id. at 406 (Blackmun, J.).
59. Id. at 376-78 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
60. See Henkin, What ofthe Right to Practicea Profession?,69 CAL. L. REV. 131 (1979)
(discussing larger constitutional issues concerning entry into the professions). This is, of
course, part of the context in which professional schools in universities function. Cf.O'Neil,
Bakke in Balance: Some PreliminaryThoughts, 67 CAL. L. REv. 143, 165-70 (1979); Posner,
The Bakke Case and the Future of '"4ffirmative Action," 67 CAL. L. REv. 171, 188 (1979)
(regarding financial, scholarship, and search policies after Bakke).
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result would be a dramatic rise in the proportion of the student body
whose expected performance would be marginal.
B.

Quotas as a Means to Adequate Representation

It is of consequence to the last point that the Brennan Four
squarely rejected Justice Powell's exclusion ab limine-as discrimination for its own sake6 '-of race-based numerical quotas, either as a policy objective or as a means, designed to produce percentage
representation.6 z For them, the only question was whether the quota
size was appropriate for remedying the evil at which it was aimed.
Since at U.C. Davis the quota of sixteen percent of all places was less
than the proportion of minority groups to the whole population of the
state and only qualified applicants were admitted, these Justices found
the quota appropriate. The remedial quota was thus substantially related to the correction of past discrimination within the Brennan Four's
63
intermediate scrutiny.
C.

Equal Protection and Individual Rights

While the Brennan Four did not frontally reject Justice Powell's
view that the equal protection clause confers rights on individuals and
not on racial groups as such, they did place caveats on it. Since past
discrimination is usually based on race, and the resulting disadvantage
therefore attaches to the group, they thought remedial action may still
(and probably must) proceed along the lines of direct identification
with that group. Thus, since the burdens on individuals left by history
may reflect on and derive from membership in the racial group, race
grouping must therefore be relevant to the equal protection clause. To
this extent, and by the same token, they found that it is not necessary as
61. 438 U.S. at 307 (Powell, J.).
62. Id. at 378-79 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.). The Brennan Four
added: "The excluded white applicant, despite Mr. Justice Powell's contention to the contrary. . . receives no more or less 'individualized consideration' under our approach than
under his." Id. at 378-79 n.63 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
63. See id. at 374-75 & n.58 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.). Although
also applying strict scrutiny, Justice Brennan employed what has been labeled an intermediate level of review. Id See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword"In Search
ofEvolving Doctrineon a ChangingCourt.-A Modelfor Newer EqualProtection,86 HARV. L.

REV. 1, 8 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther]. Brennan's review was strict, but not "'strict'
in theory and fatal in fact," because "it is stigma that causes fatality," 438 U.S. at 362
(Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.). Brennan reasoned that no stigma attached
to the white majority by virtue of the special admissions program's preference for other
races, and that "[the] purpose of remedying the effects of past societal discrimination is...
sufficiently important to justify the use of race-conscious admissions programs...." Id.
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a foundation for compensatory preference to require proof that victims
of past discrimination "have been individually discriminated against";
it is enough to show that each is "within a general class of persons
likely to have been the victims of discrimination."' When the "virtual
impossibility" of "a case by case inquiry" into the burden of disadvantage on each individual applicant is taken into account, they concluded,
"there is nothing to prevent a State from using categorical means to
achieve its ends, at least where the category is closely related to the
goal."6 5
D.

White Majority as a Suspect Class

Justice Powell sharply rejected the Regents' argument that discrimination against members of the white majority cannot be suspect if
its purpose can be characterized as benign. He observed that "[t]he
clock of our liberties. . . cannot be turned back to 1868. "66 The Brennan Four, in applying the current formulas for determining whether
strict scrutiny is required, 67 held that whites, a class to which Bakke
belonged, were not a suspect class, since they were not so saddled with
disabilities, a history of purposeful discrimination, or with political
powerlessness as to need protection from "the majoritarian political
process."6 8 Furthermore, the racial classification was relevant to the
legislative purpose.
Although Justice Powell treated whites as a suspect class, triggering strict scrutiny, the Brennan Four denied that strict scrutiny was
called for but asserted that the level of scrutiny must still be more severe than the laxest standard traditionally used in "old" equal protection cases. This standard involved asking merely whether the
challenged measure had a conceivable rational relation to the legislative purpose.69 For the Brennan Four, however, discriminatory quotas
64. Id. at 363 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.) (citing Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 357-62 (1977)).
65. Id. at 377-78 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
66. Id. at 295 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) and Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954)). The reference to 1868 appears to be to Justice Marshall's
invocation of the Freedman's Bureau Act of 1866 as proving that the Fourteenth Amend-ment, passed by the same Congress, could not have been intended to prevent differential
treatment of blacks and whites. See id., at 397 (Marshall, J.).
67. See id. at 355-62 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
68. Id. at 357 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.) (citing United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)). They also held that no "fundamental
rights" of whites were involved. Id See note 63 supra.
69. See Forunr EqualProtectionand the Burger Court,2 HASTINGS CONsT. L. Q. 64580 (1975).
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must serve "'important [and articulated] governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.' "70
Furthermore, such measures must not "stigmatize" any group or "single out" the politically weak to bear the burden of the benign program.
The reasons for this severity, despite the absence of questions of a suspect class or fundamental rights, said the Brennan Four, are threefold.
First, the tendencies of racial (as well as gender) classifications to degenerate into paternalism and the stereotyping and stigmatizing of politically weak groups warrant heightened scrutiny. Second, the fact
that race (again like gender) is an immutable characteristic which the
individual cannot escape indicates that class characteristics, rather than
individual ones, mark the individual. For both those reasons, the use
of racial classifications tends to divorce the bestowing of individual
benefits and burdens from individual merit and achievement. Third,
and finally, discrete and insular classes may exist even within the white
majority and be vulnerable to "the majoritarian political process."7 1
It will be perceived that the differences at this point between Justice Powell and the Brennan Four are more in the structure of argument than in necessary differences of result in scrutinizing a particular
use of race criteria. Their radical disagreement on numerical racial
quotas originates not from the difference between the classical strict
scrutiny and the Brennan Four's "intermediate" ("quasi-strict") scrutiny,7" but from Justice Powell's fiat assertion that such quotas
amounted to discrimination for its own sake.
It may suffice, therefore, to note in summation that quasi-strict
scrutiny as applied by the Brennan Four required them to: (1) approve
as important the articulated purposes or objectives of the compensatory
measure; (2) hold the classification used justified as a means substantially related to their achievement; (3) find that neither the persons
prejudiced nor those benefited by its use would thereby be stigmatized;
and (4) find that the persons so prejudiced were not singled out to bear
the burden because they are politically weakest or vulnerable. The
Brennan Four held that Bakke's rejection did not stigmatize him as
inferior, nor inflict on him any pervasive lifetime injury comparable to
that received by black children from school segregation.73 Nor did the
racial quota stigmatize the members of the beneficiary racial minori70. 438 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.) (quoting Califano v.
Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977)).
71. Id. at 360-61 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
72. Cf Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1976) (discussing the intermediate standard of equal protection review).
73. 438 U.S. at 375 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.). See the sharp cri-
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ties, since they were qualified to enter medical school and were subjected thereafter to the same courses and tests as others.7 4
E.

Voluntary Action Absent Findings of Past Discrimination

All the situations in which voluntary compensatory preferences by
non-governmental public bodies had been approved were, according to
Justice Powell, cases where there had already been a determination by

state or federal authorities of the existence of disadvantage to a group
flowing from past illegal discrimination.7 5 The Brennan Four explicitly
rejected this as a prerequisite for such voluntary compensatory action.7 6
Analytically, despite the mass of legislative and judicial examples
offered by the Brennan Four,7 7 it cannot be said that they met their
colleague's argument squarely. Justice Powell's conclusion was that in
the cases in question there had always been either a judicial, legislative

or administrative finding by a competent state or federal authority.
Though the Brennan Four purport to refute his position, the authorities
they offer in support seem to show merely that there is no need for a

prior judicial determination of past discrimination on which to base
voluntary remedial action. 78 And, of course, their prolific use of federal regulations and statutes to illustrate the permissibility of the remedial use of race criteria, 79 and even of numerical race quotas, in no way
tique of the point in Dixon, Bakke: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 67 CAL. L. REv. 69, 85-86
(1979).
74. See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
75. See text accompanying notes 30-35 supra. Justice Powell admitted an exception for
gender-based discrimination. See text following note 35 supra.
76. 438 U.S. at 348 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
77. See id. at 347-49 nn. 21, 22, 23 & 24. (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun,

JJ.).
78. That they are not too sanguine as to their own analysis is suggested by a footnote.
Id. at 366 n.42. There they argued that Justice Powell's condition was met in this case since
the California Constitution and relevant statutes gave "plenary legislative and administrative power" to the Regents to control the University. The very adoption of the special admissions program implied that the Regents had made the necessary legislative or
administrative determination. And these judges then proceeded to make a judicial determination on the point. See id. at 372-73 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
Other aspects of the Brennan Four's review of the cases permitting voluntary compensatory action by non-governmental public bodies, see id. at 365-66 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.), raised no issue with Justice Powell, Cf.id.at 341-50 (Brennan,
White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.) (collating regulations of federal agencies illustrative of
the same points) and id. at 353 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.) (governmental agencies may require remedial action even from bodies innocent of past discrimination).
79. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6705(f)(2) (Supp. 1979) bears on the use of federal funds for purposes
of public works employment. Section 6705(0(2) provides: "Except to the extent that the
Secretary determines otherwise, no grant shall be made under this chapter for any local
public works project unless the applicant gives satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at
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rebuts Justice Powell's argument.8" Rather, it reinforces his point, for
these are themselves legislative or administrative determinations.

IV.

Indications concerning the "Newer Equal Protection"

What do the Bakke opinions, delivered a full sabbatical cycle after
Professor Gunther's "Model for Newer Equal Protection,"'" indicate as
to its pertinence?82 Against the background of fifteen cases decided
during the 1971 Term, Professor Gunther offered a model for delimiting the scope of future judicial review of equal protection claims.83
The first specification of this model was that it should extricate the
courts from the need to make value judgments concerning governmental objectives, by requiring them to abdicate any power of judicial review over actual legislative purposes.84 The second was that it should
provide a substantial though flexible requirement for judging the suitaleast 10 per centum of the amount of each grant shall be expended for minority business
enterprises. For purposes of this paragraph, the term 'minority business enterprise' means a
business at least 50 per centum of which is owned by minority group members or, in case of
a publicly owned business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of which is owned by minority
group members. For the purposes of the preceding sentence, minority group members are
citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts."
80. See 438 U.S. at 341-50 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
81. Gunther, supra note 63.
82. The Stevens Four found that the issues were concluded in fa or of Bakke by the
prohibition of "exclusion from participation" contained in section 601 of the Civil Rights
Act, and that it was therefore unnecessary to pass either on the constitutional issue of the
equal protection clause or the anti-discrimination clause of section 601 of the Civil Rights
Act. That opinion is not therefore relevant to the present inquiry. See Section I of this
article supra.
83. See also Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under The Equal Protection
Guarantee-Prohibited,Neutral, and Permissive Classflcations, 62 GEO. L. J. 107 (1974);
Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The EqualProtectionClause, and The Three Faces ofConstitutionalEqualily, 61 VA. L. REv. 945 (1975).
84. Professor Gunther necessarily admitted that the Justices in the fifteen cases studied
had not, as the model would require, assumed the constitutional propriety of the actual
legislative ends sought by the discriminatory measure and limited equal protection review to
the propriety of the means by which these ends were pursued. Some of the very cases which
he offers as showing "the strongest pressures to resort to means-focused equal protection"
are cases in which the Court's review addressed not merely the propriety of means for
achieving legislative ends found or conceived by the Court as given, but also the very propriety of these ends themselves as a basis for discriminatory classification. They undercut his
model in this respect. See Gunther, supra note 63, at 33-37 (discussion of James v. Strange,
407 U.S., 128 (1972), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447, 448-52 (1972) and Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971)).
The fact that Justice White in Eisenstadtcame to a position via due process, 405 U.S. at
463-65, similar to that reached by Justice Brennan via equal protection reminds us that the
"new equal protection" came to be used, despite (or, perhaps, because of) the eclipse of
substantive due process, to cover review of substantive legislative ends.

Spring 19791

EQUAL PROTECTION

bility, in light of the equal protection clause, of the means adopted towards these purposes. This requirement, Professor Gunther thought,
would be "that legislative means substantially further legislative ends,"
and equal protection constraints on permissible classification would be5
"essentially a more specific formulation of that general principle.
This, he thought, could extend over the whole range of equal protection
analysis short of cases found by the court to involve fundamental interests or suspect classifications. In this latter area, the more demanding
requirements of strict scrutiny, that the means be the least restrictive
means necessary for achieving the legislative ends, would continue to
be applicable.86
There is, indeed, some evidence that at least four of the five justices who reversed in part the California court's decision were advertent to Professor Gunther's article.8 7 There is, however, little evidence
that any of them were directly advertent to the Gunther model; and no
attention was paid to that aspect of the model which would place the
actual purposes or ends of challenged legislation beyond judicial scrutiny. It is certainly not possible to suggest that any of the justices
adopted this feature of the model, even sub silentio. For all of them
seemed to hold explicitly that rulings on equal protection require that
the purposes of the challenged provisions, as well as the means of
achieving those purposes, be scrutinized by the Court.
The Justices of the Brennan Four, who dissented from Justice
Powell and the Stevens Four as to the admission of Bakke, concurred
with Powell in reversing that part of the California court's judgment
which seemed to proscribe not merely numerical quotas, but any use of
race criteria in admissions.8 8 Their reasoning differed from Justice
Powell's in many details; it also differed in its analytical framework.
On the point here under examination, however, the Brennan Four's
85. Gunther, supra note 63, at 20. Though Professor Gunther is addressing legislaive
decisions as a type case, he would presumably want the requirement to be applied to all
actions challenged under the equal protection clause, including action requested of or volunteered by non-governmental public bodies.
86. Id. at 20-23.
87. The article is cited in the opinion of the Brennan Four, though by way of a flourish
or rhetoric, on another point. These judges were concerned to deny in advance that their
testing would be (as Professor Gunther had characterised the older strict scrutiny) "strict" in
theory and "fatal" in fact. See 438 U.S. at 362 n.36 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.); note 63, supra.
88. It may be noted here that the precise meaning of the California Supreme Court's
order on this last point is disputed. The view of the five justices referred to in the text was
rejected by the Stevens Four. 438 U.S. at 409-11 & n.3 (Stevens, Burger, Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.). They read the order as not containing any such proscription.
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reasoning is just as resistant as was Justice Powell's to Professor Gunther's proposal that the Court should abjure any "value-laden" review
of actual legislative goals and limit9itself to a means-focused review for
8
conformity with equal protection.
It was not considered sufficient by the Brennan Four that the University of California at Davis had the "articulated purpose of remedying the effects of past discrimination" which had led to "substantial and
chronic underrepresentation." 9 The Justices felt it necessary to pass
on this purpose as "[s]ufficiently important to justify the use of raceconscious admissions programs," 9 ' and they gave considerable space to
prior cases which had ruled on the justification for such a legislative
purpose. 92 They did so in obedience to the principle, which they asserted at the outset, that "[our] cases have always implied that an 'overriding statutory purpose' could be found that would justify racial
classifications." 93 This would be a strange opening for a court that was
abjuring, as Professor Gunther's model recommends, any power to review legislative purposes and limiting its review to whether the means
adopted to those ends satisfied equal protection. Even in situations
such as the instant one, where these Justices regarded as applicable a
level of scrutiny short of strict, they endorsed the principle that "mere
recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield
which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying
a statutory scheme. 9 4
Justice Powell made his position on this same matter no less clear
by requiring that the impugned provision be shown to be necessary for
'95
protecting "a substantial and constitutionally permissible purpose.
And he proceeded on this basis to ask whether each of the various purposes offered in justification of the quota program at U.C. Davis was
supported by "a legitimate and substantial interest." 96 He approved as
such the purpose of abating the disabling effects of identified past discrimination, 97 and the purpose of improving the delivery of health care
services to underserved communities.9" For institutions of higher edu89. See text accompanying notes 54-80 supra.
90. 438 U.S. at 362 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 355-62 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
93. Id. at 356 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.) (citation omitted).
94. Id. at 358-59 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.) (citing Califano v.
Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) and Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975)).
95. Id. at 305 (Powell, J.).
96. Id. at 307 (Powell, J.).
97. Id. at 306 (Powell, J.).
98. Id. at 310 (Powell, J.).
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cation, he, as well as the Brennan Four, also found that the purpose of
attaining diversity in the student body, so as to promote speculation,
experiment, creativity and the like, was a constitutional purpose. 99 One
purpose of the U.C. Davis program, howeVer, that of assuring "within
its student body some specified percentage of a particular group merely
because of its race or ethnic origin," he declared to be constitutionally
impermissible-indeed to be "facially invalid."10 0
It was, of course, on this last ground that Justice Powell affirmed,
with the concurrence (on other grounds) of the Stevens Four, the decision of the California court that Bakke should be admitted. And the
point indicates unambiguously that Professor Gunther's proposal that
the Court not review legislative ends is simply not accepted in 1978.
Moreover, it raises the even graver objection against his model that the
distinction between ends and means, which is its fulcrum, is in itself a
very dubious one, at any rate in this area of social affairs. Justice Powell had to confront the licitness of racial percentages both at the level of
ends and at the level of means. He not only held that the assurance of a
specified percentage of a racial group as such was "facially invalid" as
a purpose or end; he also held that even for meeting the three other
purposes, which he found to be substantial and constitutionally permissible, the fixing of such specified percentage was an impermissible
means because it was not "necessary to promote" those purposes. 10
On the other hand, the positions of most of the majority Justices
who reversed in part the California ruling do fit within the specifications of the Gunther model concerningthe needfor intermediatelevels of
scrutiny. Justice Powell brought the case within the ambit of strict
scrutiny proper, and his opinion therefore adds little on the point. 102
The Brennan Four, however, who on the wider second issue of whether
there could constitutionally be any consideration of race in admissions
programs, concurred with Justice Powell in reversing the California
99. Id. at 311-12 (Powell, J.).
100. Id. at 307 (Powell, J.).
101. See, e.g., id at 310-11 (Powell, J.) (regarding delivery of health care services) and id.
at 311-15 (Powell, J.) (regarding diversity in the student body).
102. Id. at 305-20 (Powell, J.). As previously indicated, Justice Powell distinguished the
main groups of cases in which voluntary measures constituting benign discrimination remedial of past discrimination had apparently been approved without being subjected to strict
scrutiny, on the ground that they were based on prior legislative, judicial or administrative
determination of disadvantage flowing from past discrimination. Id. at 300-10 (Powell, J.).
As to the other purposes (improving health services and diversifying the student body), he
concluded that, permissible and even "compelling" as these purposes (ends) were, the particular measures (means) of two-track numerical quotas adopted by U.C. Davis were "neither
needed nor geared to promote" them. Id. at 310-19 (Powell, J.).
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court, followed a structure of reasoning as to the need for such intermediate scrutiny closely matching the model.' °3 They explicitly rejected
any grounds for invoking strict scrutiny, holding that no fundamental
right was involved in admissions to medical schools.'" The classification of whites was neither suspect in the accepted sense' 5 nor irrelevant to the ends sought; nor did the use of a racial classification
stigmatize the whites prejudiced or the minorities benefited by it, nor
'0 6
"put the weight of government behind racial hatred and separatism."'
At this point the opinion by the Brennan Four articulated with
rare judicial clarity the reasoning involved in the extension of judicial
intervention into what may be called the no man's land between the
judicial deference and passivity associated with the "old" pre-Warren
Court equal protection, and the area occupied by the Warren Court's
"new" strict scrutiny equal protection. In that no man's land the Brennan Four, having found strict scrutiny inapplicable, could readily have
concluded that the special admissions program was rationally related to
the objectives of that program. Instead, they were zealous to insist that
"the fact that this case does not fit neatly into our prior analytic framework for race cases does not mean that it should be analyzed by applying the very loose rational-basis standard of review that is the very least
that is always applied in equal protection cases."' 0 7 Rather, they declared that certain considerations-to be mentioned below-led them
to conclude that racial classifications, aimed at remedying disadvantages stemming from prior discrimination, "must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives."'0 ° While the strict scrutiny of "new equal protection" was not applicable, scrutiny had to be strict and searching nonetheless.
The considerations leading to this conclusion have already been
discussed in Section III, but they may be briefly recalled. They included the risk, with racial as with gender-based classifications, of their
being used "to stereotype and stigmatize politically powerless segments
of society."' 0 9 Distribution of benefits and burdens on the basis of such
103. 438 U.S. at 350-56 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, J.J.).
104. Id. at 357 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
105. See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra.
106. Id. at 357-58 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.). See Section III supra.
107. Id. at 358 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
108. Id. at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.) (citing Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977), and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
109. Id. at 360 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.) (quoting Kahn v. Sherin,
416 U.S. 351, 357 (1971) (dissenting opinion)).
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immutable characteristics as race and gender runs counter to the general dedication of the political order to criteria involving individual
merit and responsibilities. 1 ' As the Brennan Four stated, "[T]here are
limits beyond which majorities may not go when they classify on the
basis of immutable characteristics.""' It was for these reasons that
scrutiny must be "strict and searching," even though (if emulation of
judicial lucidity be permitted) "strict" scrutiny was strictly not applicable.
Whatever name is given to this intermediate level scrutiny"quasi-strict scrutiny" may here be used for the time being-the judicial recognition of it has gone beyond the inchoateness which Gunther
noted at the time he constructed this aspect of his model in 1972. There
are clear signs of flexibility in the Court's level of scrutiny of the appropriateness of legislative objectives and the nature of the subject of legislation. Of course, all this may have emerged from the inner dialectic of
judicial reasoning; but even then it would sustain in 1978 this part of
Professor Gunther's model of 1972.
Certainly, the Brennan Four explicitly, and Justice Powell tacitly,
approached the question of suitability of means to ends in terms of a
demonstrably genuine relation of the means adopted to the achievement of the policy objectives. In contrast, strict scrutiny asks only
whether the means were necessary to this achievement and entails the
very least possible discrimination between those within the classification and those without. That genuine relation was for the University to
show by empirical evidence as to the composition of the student body,
the level of medical services to minorities and the like. Even as to the
suitability of means, Gunther correctly recognized that the questions
for the Court are "neither mechanical nor value-free.""'
He comforted himself with the thought that, even then, the value judgments
involved would still be of a lesser scale and range than those involved if
the Court ignored that part of his model which called for it to renounce
judicial review of the legislative objectives themselves.
One thing shown by the present analysis is that the Justices are
certainly not ready to make that renunciation; value judgments of the
larger scale and range are still involved in equal protection determinations." 3 And this outcome marches with the present writer's major
110. Id. at 360-61 (Brennan, white, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
111. Id. at 361 (Brennan, white, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
112. Gunther, supra note 63, at 47-48.
113. Professor Gunther further conceded that even if both parts of his model had been
accepted, the difficult line between means and ends would often have to be drawn by refer-
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theme, expressed elsewhere, that even in decisions implementing the
constitutional precept demanding equal protection of the laws, what is
crucial is often not the value of equality itself but the other values
which must inevitably guide the Court in using or setting limits to it, or
14
in choosing between its conflicting equivocations.'

V.

Indications for Future Special Programs

And the king said, Bring me a sword And they brought a
sword before the king.
And the king said,Divide the living child in two, andgive ha/f
to the one, andhaf to the other.
Then spake the woman whose the living child was unto the
king,for her bo welsyearnedupon herson, andshe said,0 my lord,
give her the living child, and in no wise slay it. But the other said,
Let it be neither mine nor thine, but divide it.
Then the king answeredandsaid,Give her the living child,and
in no wise slay it. she is the mother thereof.115
The Bakke opinions, whatever else be said, have complicated
rather than simplified both benign discrimination and the understanding of the equal protection clause. Partition seems to have been an
active principle working through the Bakke case, though what will
eventually be saved, and by whose wisdom, is not yet clear. The question of Bakke's exclusion was partitioned off, by one majority, from the
question of the permissibility of any consideration of race in admissions policies. I16 The Stevens Four hung their decision on terms like
"exclusion" used in section 601 of the Civil Rights Act but not on the
equal protection clause. Justice Powell hung his decision on the rather
mysterious reasoning that while it is a substantial and constitutionally
permissible end to compensate for underrepresentation of minorities
arising from past discrimination, to introduce numerical racial quotas
as the means towards this end was to prefer some persons "for no other
reason than race or ethnic origin," constitutionally impermissible as ei1 17
ther end or means.
ence to the breadth of value judgments which have to be made. Id. at 48. Since this question appears now to be rather moot, we need not examine the possibility that this way of
distinguishing ends and means may be circular.
114. See Stone, Justice in the Slough ofEquality, 29 HASTINGs L. J. 995 (1978).
115. 1 Kings 3:24-27 (King James).
116. Though sections 703(a)(1) and 703(a)(2) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (on
employment) do not include the precise term "exclusion," they do include terms of identical
meaning such as "fail or refuse to hire," "discharge" and "deprive... of equal opportunity."
117. See Sections I & II supra.
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It was not only the issue, however, that was thus partitioned. The
justices partitioned the Court itself into the Stevens Four (who declined
to speak, on the ground that it was unnecessary to do so, to the permissibility of considerations of race) on the one hand, and the Brennan
Four (who spoke directly and rather unambiguously on that issue) on
the other, with Justice Powell hovering uneasily in between. The outcome on the question of the permissibility of race as a criterion under
the equal protection clause was itself partitioned between one approach-numerical racial quotas aimed at percentage representationforbidden by the single vote of Justice Powell, and another approachthe use of racial criteria along with other general criteria of disadvantage or contribution-which was held permissible in a rather wholesale
manner by the Brennan Four as well as by Justice Powell within limits
rather inadequately specified.
The generosity of the Brennan Four's wholesale tolerance of racial
criteria, as well as the uncertain limits of Justice Powell's, together suggest that further cases are bound to be presented which will require the
wholesale to be made retail, and the limits to be specified further. The
solidarity of the Brennan Four, moreover, gives no assurance of how
future majorities will swing. The trouble is not Justice Blackmun's
aside, to the effect that for him the U.C. Davis program was "within
constitutional bounds, though perhaps barely so."" ' 8 It is far more serious, springing from the very first partition mentioned above, under
which the Stevens Four refused to touch at all upon the constitutional
or even statutory issues of equal protection. Future variations of race
criteria in compensatory admissions policies will also depend critically
on how some of the Stevens Four divide, and on what specific lines
Justice Powell draws for himself in relation to them.
Despite the relaxed attitudes of many American judges to the niceties of precedent, it is well to recall that in the view of the Stevens Four,
there was more than one reason why Justice Powell and the Brennan
Four ought never to have touched upon the wider second issue of the
permissibility of any consideration of race in admissions programs. In
the Stevens Four's reading of the California judgment, it included no
order enjoining any consideration of the race of applicants for admission to U.C. Davis, other than that of Alan Bakke himself. The injunction only restrained the University of California "from considering
118. 438 U.S. at 406 (Blackmun, J.). It fits with this tentativeness of Justice Blackmun
that in Weber he emphasized the temporary nature of the affirmative action plan adopted by
Kaiser. United Steelworkers of American v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2734 (1979) (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
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plaintiff's race or the race of any other applicant in passing upon his
application for admission."'' 9 In their view, the final "his" referred to
Bakke only and not to applicants generally. On this basis nothing except what has been called "the first issue" (Bakke's right to admission)
was before the Supreme Court of the United States. The Stevens Four
opened their judgment with the words: "It is always important at the
outset to focus precisely on the controversy before the Court," and a
few sentences later they stated: "This is not a class action. The controversy is between two specific litigants."' 20 It concerned only the numerical racial quota program under which Bakke was excluded. For
them, everything uttered by Justice Powell and the Brennan Four on
the wider second issue was strictly obiter dictum.' 2 '
The distinction between ratio decidendi and obiter dictum is not, of
course, as clear in American conditions as many English lawyers pretend it to be for theirs. Yet the vehemence with which the Stevens Four
made this point at least reinforces the impression that the fate of racial
considerations, apart from numerical racial quotas designed to produce
percentage representation, is a matter on which some of them feel
strongly-and probably differently from the Brennan Four. The future
legal fate of quotas may therefore still be in the balance.
The wisdom of the Solomonic stratagem of dividing the child did
not, of course, lie in any application of the principle of equality. It lay
rather in the wise monarch's understanding of the passions, greeds,
dedications and capacity for selfless sacrifice of the human heart, and
of the relations which unite and divide human beings. This is a truth to
seize and cherish as we ponder the future of racial admissions criteria
in universities. The "universitas" which the very name "universities"
symbolizes, is as vulnerable to partition as the living child in Solomon's
judgment.
119. Paragraph 2 of the California trial court judgment, as affirmed by the Supreme
Court of California quotedin 438 U.S. at 409 n.2 (Stevens, Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ. and
Burger, C.J). See id. at 408-11 & nn.2, 3 & 5 (Stevens, Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ. and
Burger, C.J.) for full text and the Stevens Four's analysis.
120. 438 U.S. at 408 (Stevens, Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ. and Burger. C.J.). A footnote
to the first sentence above observed that "[the Brennan Four] have undertaken to announce
the. . . effect of [the] Court's judgment," but recalled that "only- a majority can speak for
the Court or determine what is the 'central meaning' of any judgment .. ."Id. at 408 n.1
(Stevens, Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ. and Burger, C.J.). This, of course, questions the authority of the Brennan Four's opening statement. Id. at 324-25 (Brennan, White, Marshall and
Blackmun, JJ.) (quotedin Section III supra). See also id at 271-72 (Powell, J.); Sections I &
II supra (Justice Powell's effort at formulation).
121. 438 U.S. 265, 408-12 (Stevens, Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ. and Burger, C.J.). Cf.
Blasi, Bakke as a Precedent: Does Mr. JusticePowell Have a Theory, 67 CAL. L. REV.21,
22-23, 36-61 (1979) for an analysis in terms of precedent).
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The cardinal question now confronting efforts to give vitality to
the just impulse towards benign discrimination in the universities lies
precisely here. Do those concerned, including the judges, have the understanding of human passions, greeds, dedications and capacity for
selfless sacrifice to transform a threat of destructive division into a continuing institutional life of mutual compassion and enrichment? This
will be the qualitative test of the further guidelines still required for
emergent programs designed to grant compensatory preferences in the
wide area of tolerance of racial considerations common to Justice Powell and the Brennan Four.
For reasons already hinted at, however, even the permissibility of
"two-track" numerical racial quotas of the type involved in Bakke cannot be ruled out. As matters stand'after Bakke, four of the Justicesthe Stevens Four-are not committed either way on that issue, for they
carefully rested their decision on words in the Civil Rights Act having
no counterpart in the equal protection clause.22 And since four other
Justices-the Brennan Four--did find such quotas acceptable, it would
require only one of the former group to commit himself favorably on
quotas to legitimate them. 23
In the face of these possibilities, the present writer should not
shrink from a final word concerning the stark conflict between Justice
Powell and the Brennan Four who concurred with him, precisely on
this issue of numerical racial quotas geared to produce percentage racial representation as a means of affording compensatory preference. It
will already have become clear that the present writer does not find
analytically convincing Justice Powell's condemning ab limine as
facially invalid "the purpose of assuring some specified percentage of
minority groups.""
For this ignored the question of whether the
shortfall itself was not a significant part of the continuing disadvantage
resulting from past illegal discrimination. Reference has also been
made to related responses to Justice Powell by the Brennan Four, the
gist of which was to question as inconsistent Justice Powell's willingness to accept as evidence of disadvantage a basket of factors, including
race, even if these were designed to produce an approximation to the
same specified percentage of the same groups. "The cynical," said Justice Blackmun in a phrase worth quoting twice, "may say that under a
122. While Justice Stewart, one of the Stevens Four, voted with the majority in Weber, it
must be remembered that this was a decision based on Title VII rather than Title VI. See
note 130 infra.
123. Cf. Dixon, Bakke: A ConsttutionalAnalysis, 67 CAL. L. REv. 69, 72-73 (1979) (on
this and other fragilities of the ratio by which Justice Powell ruled out quotas).
124. 438 U.S. at 307 (Powell, J.).
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program such as Harvard's one may accomplish covertly what Davis
concedes it does openly."' 2 5
Even, however, after any analytical weakness of Justice Powell's
presentation has been noted, his conclusion on this matter may nevertheless be found sociologically and ethically preferable to that of the
Brennan Four. Space forbids a full presentation of reasons, but the
gravity of the issue commands at least their outlines.

VI.

Universities and the First Amendment Connection

Section II of this article demonstrated that one element of Justice
Powell's position which led him to produce the majority with the Brennan Four was his recognition of the countervailing interest, anchored
in the First Amendment, in speculation, experiment, creation and robust exchange. While this interest is compelling throughout the polity,
universities have special responsibilities in furthering it: "Academic
freedom.. . . long has been viewed as a special concern of the First
Amendment."' 2 6 Justice Powell held that since the diversity thus sanctified is far wider than mere racial diversity, racial quotas were neither
a necessary nor a feasible means towards it, although race could figure
among the wider range of relevant factors.' 2 7
It may be said at once that this approach, assuming it to be otherwise tenable, is jurisprudentially attractive. For it may offer a path by
which equal protection can be functionally molded through principles
appropriate to that segment of national life, embracing universities and
similar institutions, dedicated to the transmission and expansion of
knowledge. It must be clear that reasoned elaborations designed to
give equal protection sufficient meaning to function within each arena
is essential if the jungle threatening to engulf that clause is to be reduced. To require that every equal protection determination be
mechanically transferable to every social arena is to compound progressively all the numerous problems rather than to solve any of them.
Accordingly, claims that Justice Powel's First Amendment diversity principle is not transferable to the employment arena may point to
a strength rather than a weakness. 2 ' And it is, of course, consistent
with this desideratum that neither the majority nor the minority in
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber'2 9 allowed constitutional is125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 406 (Blackmun, J.).
Id. at 312 (Powell, J.).
Id. at 315-19 (Powell, J.).
See A. SINDLER, supra note 2, at 320.
99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
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sues, as distinct from the mere construction of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, to play a part in the decision. 3 ° There is obviously no First
Amendment nexus, similar to that for universities, which calls for a
manufacturer of aircraft or refrigerators to have a culturally or educationally diversified board of directors.' 3 '
Professor Sindler has sought to dismiss Justice Powell's diversity
ground as idiosyncratic and not viable as a general rule.' 32 His main
ground is that if the First Amendment did indeed provide the compelling interest underlying the freedom of universities to promote diversity, universities could use this freedom, not to pursue diversity in the
student body 4 approved by Justice Powell and the Brennan Four in
Bakke, but instead to pursue conformity and homogeneity. 33 In the
present writer's view this is not the more likely, let alone the necessary
outcome of his position. Professor Sindler, as well as Professor Dixon,
can only conjure up the dread possibility they envisage by interpreting
Powell to mean that the First Amendment legitimizes the enterprise
which we know as a university, including whatever objectives a university
chooses to pursue, whether these be to promote uniformity or to promote
diversity. However, the far more likely meaning of Justice Powell's position, which is, indeed, quite explicit in the Justice's elaboration from
Justice Frankfurter's words in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 34 is that it is
the goal of diversity as a means to further robust exchange which is
protected by the First Amendment, and that university admission
policies areprotectedinsofaras theypromote this goalofdiversity.'35 On
that basis the reductio adabsurdum offered by these writers can scarcely
130. Of course the employer's impugned action in Weber was not state action. It is nevertheless noteworthy that there appears to have been no such references to the relation of
Title VII to constitutional restraints as were made in Bakke to the relation of Title VI,
section 601 to them. In fact, the majority in Weber specifically noted that Title VII and Title
VI "cannot be read inparimateria." 99 S. Ct. at 2729 n.6. By this they appear to mean at
least that insofar as Title VI refers to education, an area of direct federal-state involvement,
the constitutional standards of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are attracted to it.
There is no such necessary attraction in the context of private employment, to which Title
VII is addressed.
131. Cf. Posner, The Bakke Case and the Future of "Affrmative Action," 67 CAL. L. REV.
171, 188-89.
132. A. SINDLER, supra note 2, at 311-12.
133. Cf. Dixon, Bakke: A Constitutional.Analysis,67 CAL. L. REV. 6§, 75-78 (1979).
134. 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957).
135. "Thus, in arguing that its universities must be accorded the right to select those
students who will contribute the most to the 'robust exchange of ideas,' petitioner invokes a
countervailing constitutional interest, that of the First Amendment. In this light, petitioner
must be viewed as seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission." 438 U.S. at 313 (Powell, J.).
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36

It may thus be argued, along the different line here adopted, that
the Powell diversity ground establishes that criteria for race-conscious
university admissions will only be entitled to First Amendment protection if they are actually (or at any rate "rationally") related to the goal
of educational diversity. Though the criteria may include race, they
must also include a sufficient range of other criteria which genuinely
serve to measure 7 thepotential contributionsto diversity ?f all applicants
3
for admissions.'
The clarity of this ratio decidendi-its "rationality" in current
jargon-should not be concealed by the cynical observation that preference indirectly produced by a basket of factors, including race, is in-

distinguishable from that produced by racial quotas.
observation is false in a crucial respect.

3

1

For this

It is false even when exactly

the same percentage representation of the disadvantaged racial group is
achieved by both approaches. The identity of the outcome is only as to

the relative sizes of minority and majority groups. When the impact of
the two approaches on individual applicants is examined, however, the
direct and indirect preferences are seen to be massively different. They
are likely to be different as regards which individual applicants win
admission, especially in the minority track. More importantly, how-

ever, they have different psychological effects on
applicants, especially
39

white applicants, who do not gain admission.'

136. So also it would remove any basis for Professor Sindler's claim that justice proceeded "on ad hoc grounds of whose ox was gored." A. SINDLER, supra note 2, at 312. In
the sense that uniformity of gender or color within a particular university is argued to promote robust discussion merely in the sense of removing the inhibitions of members of an "in
group" arising from the presence of diversity, it would certainly not fall within this ground
of Justice Powell.
137. Cf. Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. JusticePowell Have a Theory?, 67 CAL. L.
REv. 21, 22-23, 61, 66 (1979). See also id at 62-67 (regarding various types of race-conscious
programs in this light). Mr. Blasi considers alternative rationes decidendi for the Powell
position centered on dignity of applicants and reduction of racial prejudice. In preferring
the diversity ground he insufficiently stresses that this expresses the thrust of First Amendment freedom of expression for which universities are a conduit par excellence. Id. at 35-62.
138. So, and for the similar reasons below, is Professor Dworkin's overly facile assertion
that it is "either hypocritical or unrealistic" to recommend "that universities pursue racially
explicit goals through racially neutral means." Dworkin, The Bakke Case: An Exchange,
N.Y. Rev. of Books, Jan. 26, 1978, at 44 n. I. Cf.id. at 43 (for the converse of some of the
above positions). The exchange followed Professor Dworkin's rather unprophetically titled
article, W4hy Bakke Has No Case, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Nov. 10, 1977, at 11.
139. In his rather severe critique of Justice Powell's position, Professor Sindler gives too
little attention to these different psychological impacts and to the related effects of multifactoral criteria which may encourage applicants towards efforts to improve their prospects
for admission. A. SINDLER, supra note 2, at 312-14.
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In the face of direct racial quotas, as indeed Justice Powell as well
as the Brennan Four pointed out, exclusion is felt to be based on an
immutable characteristic of the applicant for which he neither can nor
should feel any responsibility. It must consequently be felt to be
openly and blatantly unjust by him, by his family, and widely (if more
diffusely) throughout the white community. The fact that many in the
white community are conscious of the grievous past wrongs for which
the quota is intended to compensate, does not neutralize the new cause
and sense of injustice which, at a certain point, may exacerbate rather
than pacify racial tensions.
When, on the other hand, numerous factors are used as evidence
of disadvantage of particular applicants, or of possible contributions by
them, many of these factors may not have the immutability of race. As
to some of them, applicants may even be able to make efforts to improve their prospective scores, and thus their chance of admission. Justice Powell himself listed "unique work or service experience,
leadership potential, maturity . . . ability to communicate with the
poor." 4 ° One might add capacity to contribute to minority, urban or
other social problems, bilingualism and the like. And all this would
remain true however deliberately the various factors are weighted in
order to assure that the entrants include the desired number from minorities. No doubt there would still be complaints from excluded
whites, but the complaints would not appear, nor indeed be, so clearly
well-grounded. There might even be charges that the whole system of
factors and weightings is "rigged" against the disappointed applicant.
Yet there could then at least be the answer that efforts must continue to
make the admission process as fair as possible for him and all other
applicants, consistently with the community-approved objective of
transitional compensation for wrongs inflicted by past discrimination. 14 Corresponding real benefits in terms of dignity, self-esteem
and a sense of the worthwhileness of effort would also seem likely to
flow to minority applicants as a result of following the indirect rather
than direct technique in granting racial preference.
140. 438 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J.).
141. As Professor Bell does well to remind us, black advances have historically involved-and continue to involve-changes in policies which oppress certain layers of whites,
as well as blacks. Bell, Bakke, MinorityAdmissions, andthe UsualPriceofRacialRemedies,
67 CAL. L. REv. 3, 14-19 (1979). When changes are achieved, "whites usually will prove the
primary beneficiaries, and blacks will have paid the major cost." Id. at 16. See id. at 17-18
concerning the effects of quotas in exacerbating the fears of lower and middle class whites,
and the injury to minority self-esteem arising from dual systems in admissions and classrooms. Cf Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice PowellHave a Theory?, 67 CAL. L.
REv. 21, 64-66 (1979) (for another view on these points).
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The final question, be it added, as between the direct "two-track"
and indirect multi-factor approaches, concerns neither analytical power
nor constitutional or legal propriety. It is the question of what is administratively feasible in the institutions concerned, especially when
the number of applicants to be processed is sometimes as much as eight
to ten times greater than the number of places. Answers to this question should be awaited from the appropriate administrators, rather
than preempted by judicial assumptions. Within the framework established by its First Amendment connection, the diversity multifactoral
approach calls, of course, for constant anxiety and vigilance against
abuse and dtournement of the wide discretions involved. Yet it is also
true that the very shortcomings of this approach, which stir this anxiety, may also have the redeeming virtues of inviting or even demanding
1 42
a period of enlightened and imaginative experimentation.

142. Common complaints are that the Powell diversity approach confers (or imposes) too
much discretion on university administrators, with too little guidance and control to ensure
conscientious application. It might even be used, some have urged, to set up informal statistical limits for the size of particular groups alleged to be "over-represented," as notoriously
occurred in the 1920's and 30's. See, e.g., A. SrNDLER, supra note 2, at 316-17; Greenawalt,
The UnresolvedProblems ofReverse Discrimination,67 CAL. L. REV. 87. 120-29 (1979). See
also O'Neil, Bakke in Balance: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 67 CAL. L. REv. 143, 158-65,
170 (1979) (discussing other detailed uncertainties within the Powell diversity approach).

